

~~TOP SECRET~~

2433c

TELELOFAX 3

Sanitized - Approved ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ RDP78-01617A000600040002-6

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

11

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM NO. 193

4 August 1949

SUBJECT: CIA Comment on Selected Questions on Presentation by
JIG on Phase I of JIC 435/21, dated 16 May 1949.

REFERENCE: IM-192, same subject, covering other questions previously
commented on.

1. Page 2. Question 5.

Question - The Satellite States present a special problem. Is it not a strong factor in preventing Russia from going to war in the near future; that is until she has the satellite countries completely under her yoke?

Comment - The defection of Tito, the discontent of the large majority of the populations concerned, and the unstable economic conditions which prevail throughout the orbit, have combined to make the satellites an important deterrent to Soviet armed action in the near future. While these conditions constitute a deterrent to initiation of hostilities by the Soviets, it is estimated that if other more overriding obstacles (such as lack of the A-bomb) are removed, it is improbable that the

25X6A Kremlin would delay armed action solely because of the satellite situation.

Note: This memorandum has not been coordinated with the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force.

Document No. 061

NO CHANGE in Class. ☐

~~TOP SECRET~~

☒ DECLASSIFIED

Class. CHANGED TO: TS S (C)

DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77

Auth: DDA REG. 77/1763

Date: 10/11/77 By: 011

Sanitized - Approved ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ : CIA-RDP78-01617A000600040002-6

25X6A02-

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3. Page 7. Question 10.

Question - "What seems the best current estimate concerning developments in Greece through 1952?"

Comment -

MILITARY

Greece, with continued US military aid, will probably be able before 1952 to reduce the guerrillas within its borders to a relatively small but persistent underground, subversive, and sabotage movement, although Soviet-sponsored attempts to aid the Greek Communist movement generally may be increased. The containment of this movement, with its constant threat of resurgence through outside Communist aid, will probably require Greece in 1952 to maintain its army and gendarmerie at a level considerably greater than so-called "normal" or "peacetime" strength, and in any case at a cost which Greece alone could not afford.

ECONOMIC

With US economic aid continued according to plan, Greece will, by 1952, have accomplished a moderately effective rehabilitation of its agriculture and herding, and may have effected an actual improvement over its relatively low prewar level in mining and industries. It is unlikely, however, that by 1952 it will be able to accomplish the doubling of its national income, and the reduction of imports by one third, that might then make the country independent of outside financial assistance. Demands upon the government's budget will probably still exceed by a dangerous margin the nation's ability to pay.

POLITICAL

The political stability of Greece will probably be little better in 1952 than it is at present. The moderating influence of US advisers will tend to decline with the progress of the aid program and the probable holding of new elections in Greece before 1952. By 1952 it will be extremely difficult to maintain a coalition government such as the present one, although no one party is likely to hold a clear majority. It is therefore quite possible that some one party, perhaps the Populists or a combination of Liberals and other elements,

- 2 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-01617A000600040002-6

will resort to at least some authoritarian measures in order to control the government.

PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SUBVERSIVE

Sharp fluctuations in the morale of the Greek people will probably still present a serious problem in 1952, inasmuch as a combination of unfavorable factors will keep the Greeks uncertain of their internal security. Any threats of satellite or combined Soviet-satellite invasion, however, will serve to reaffirm, and even to strengthen, the will of Greece to resist.

CONCLUSIONS

Greece will still be far from stable in 1952, but it will not lose its firm will to resist Soviet or Soviet-satellite invasion. Although Greece will probably make considerable progress by 1952 toward the solution of its major military and economic problems, it cannot hope to become self-sufficient before 1957 at the earliest. The Communists will continue to make every conceivable effort to exploit this situation, and will retain considerable underground potentialities. Thus Greece in 1952 will probably remain vulnerable to the persistent Communist threat to return it to a state of chaos.

4. Page 7. Question 11.

Question - "What is the estimated ability of the UN to affect the development of international affairs through 1952? What will be the effect of the Atlantic Pact and of Soviet control of China upon the influence and policies of the UN? What will be the effect on the US if the USSR becomes very cooperative in the UN, agreeing even to UN control over atomic bombs?"

Comment -

I. Estimated ability of the UN to affect the development of international affairs through 1952.

The UN will have only a limited effect on the crucial East-West struggle through 1952 because of Soviet obstruction of effective UN action in this field. It will, however, continue to exercise a moderating influence on East-West issues and, more particularly, on secondary international issues not involving the USSR directly. Moreover, the UN will serve as a means for further lining up the non-Soviet world against the USSR.

UN ability to affect international affairs, especially the key East-West struggle, is sharply limited by the very nature of the

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-01617A000600040002-6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

organization. Created upon the presupposition of great-power cooperation, the UN was not expected to have to deal coercively with great-power conflicts, and the powers of the Security Council were limited by the veto. This concept of great-power cooperation, however, has foundered upon the USSR's basic hostility to the UN. The USSR sees in the UN only a reflection of the policies of the Western allies and views it as a Western-dominated obstacle to its own revolutionary aims. The resultant Soviet use of the veto and general obstructionism has practically hamstrung UN action on East-West issues and the development of international atomic and armaments controls or the police force. In this context the UN has become merely another forum for the East-West struggle, particularly in the propaganda field.

Nevertheless, the UN has exercised some moderating influence on East-West issues and more particularly on secondary international issues not directly involving the USSR. Despite Soviet obstructionism, the UN still exerts influence through its ability to arouse and channel world opinion, its provision of machinery through which compromise settlements can be reached, and the fact that the spotlighting of issues before a world body exercises restraints on the parties. In cases such as those of Palestine, Kashmir, and Indonesia, where the Soviet Union was not directly affected, the UN has materially contributed to the moderating of disputes. Even on such issues as Berlin, Korea, Greece, and particularly Iran, the UN has exercised some moderating influence on the USSR. The UN has also assumed a role in the liquidation of the colonial problem and will reduce the risk of sharp clashes between the new Asian nationalisms and the colonial powers.

Therefore, although inherently incapable of having a major effect on the East-West struggle, the UN has had and will continue to have a beneficial, though limited, effect on general international affairs and a minor indirect effect on US-Soviet relations through 1952. In the event of Soviet withdrawal from the UN or of an East-West war before 1953, the UN would probably be converted into a Western-controlled power bloc which might be of direct usefulness in orienting the entire non-Soviet world behind the Western allies.

II. The effect of the Atlantic Pact upon the influence and policies of the UN.

The Atlantic Pact will not undermine the UN but will in fact strengthen it indirectly insofar as the East-West conflict is concerned. To the extent which the Pact and related defense measures strengthen the power position of the Western nations which command a

- 4 -

~~TOP SECRET~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

a majority in the UN, it will indirectly strengthen the voice with which the UN speaks. While the Soviet veto will still bar UN enforcement action, the growth of Western strength would make the USSR more hesitant to flout such UN measures as are backed by the AP powers. Since the development of the Western military bloc is a long-term problem, however, it is unlikely to have much tangible effect on Soviet UN policies through 1952.

III. The effect of Soviet control of China upon the influence and policies of the UN.

A shift to Soviet-controlled Chinese representation in the UN would have only minor effects on UN influence and policies through 1952.

Soviet control of China would increase the Soviet propaganda potential in the UN and give an appearance of wider geographic distribution to Communist policies. Furthermore, a Communist China might exercise some regional attraction on neighboring UN members such as Burma and Siam. There would be some confusion in the minds of "neutral" members as to whether Chinese positions were taken exclusively under the direction of the USSR or whether the Chinese were truly upholding regional interests in the face of Western "imperialist" pressure. Since the USSR already has a veto, the shift of the Chinese veto power from a Nationalist to a Communist representative would have little real effect on Security Council voting other than to shift the onus from the USSR to China as well.

IV. Effect on the US if the USSR becomes very cooperative in the UN, agreeing even to UN control over atomic bombs.

A shift to Soviet cooperation in the UN would be detrimental to US interests to the extent that it would revive confusion and uncertainty as to ultimate Soviet intentions and thus weaken the ability of the US to develop a strong anti-Soviet bloc.

Any Soviet cooperation in the UN would almost certainly be based on a tactical decision by the USSR to abandon present obstructionism and propaganda in anticipation of a resultant relaxation of Western defensive measures. Feigned Soviet UN cooperation, unless cancelled out by aggressive Soviet moves in other spheres, could significantly reduce the stimulus for other powers to cooperate wholeheartedly with the US in political and military consolidation against the USSR. It might stimulate latent pressures for development of a Third Force. Other states might be strongly tempted to lean over backwards in order to convince the USSR that cooperation pays in the light of Soviet long-term interests and should be permanently adopted.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

This attitude might manifest itself most immediately in relation to the Atlantic Pact. Once the external pressure induced by the fear of Soviet aggression was relaxed by outwardly cooperative Soviet policies, it might prove difficult in the face of the resultant European psychological let-down to muster the degree of sacrifice and cooperation necessary to develop the Atlantic Pact into a real deterrent to eventual Soviet aggression.

Since more responsible statesmen have come to understand the true nature of ultimate Soviet objectives and would meet any shift of Soviet cooperation in the UN with a certain amount of skepticism and caution, the immediate effect of such a Soviet shift would be relatively slight. However, as the USSR continued to follow through with a conciliatory line, the tendency of war-weary Europeans to take the Soviet shift at face value would develop and any attempt on the part of their governments or of the US to warn them of Soviet duplicity would be increasingly difficult to justify. Communists, fellow-travelers and pacifists would be in a strong position to attack Western leaders as "warmongers" and thus to bring considerable popular pressure to bear. This situation would constitute a major threat to US interests.

In the light of Soviet aversion to opening its territory to international investigation and control teams and of Soviet unwillingness to accept authority of any international body infringing on its own national sovereignty, the likelihood of Soviet agreement to effective UN control over atomic energy before 1953 is remote. Nevertheless, if the USSR should agree to a majority-approved control arrangement, the US would be faced with a vital security problem. Any practicable scheme of control and inspection would be vulnerable to evasion, particularly in such a vast area; and since the USSR would undoubtedly take advantage of this weakness, the US might be faced with a situation in which, should it voluntarily strip itself of atomic weapons, it could be confronted with a powerful potential aggressor secretly and illegally armed with these. Were the USSR to agree to the original US control plan and were the US then to repudiate its own offer, a seriously detrimental effect on US prestige and leadership in the UN would result.

- 6 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-01617A000600040002-6

STAFF INTELLIGENCE GROUP

Editorial Review

incorporated in 193
Project: IM - 195

Received from: IOG

Date: 4 August 1949

Priority:

Subject: THE UN THROUGH 1952

Reviewed in G/SI by: (1) *Prof*
(2) _____
(3) _____

Returned to Branch: _____

Received in G/SI: _____

Date: 8/4/49

Approved by: *Prof*

Date: 9/4/49

Final Revision Approved by: *(Signature)*

Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-01617A000600040002-6

~~TOP SECRET~~

STAFF INTELLIGENCE GROUP

DOCUMENT CONTROL

Series 1M Classification TS (24330)
 Number 193 Number of copies 20
 Date of Document 4 Aug 49

DISTRIBUTION

COPY NO. BRANCH OR AGENCY DATE SIGNATURE OR RECEIPT

2-6 JIG 8/5
 7 DCI 8/5
 8 AD/RGE 8/5
 2-6 JIG 8/8
 9-10 IOG 8/15
 11 OGD 9/23



25X1A9a